INTRODUCTION
A benefactor establishes an irrevocable trust for the benefit of her children, grandchildren, and future descendants, with the express provision that "adoptions shall not be recognized." Years later, the settlor's daughter and her husband, using a donated ovum and the husband's sperm, hire a gestational carrier to carry the child to term. A California court declares the daughter to be the mother, although she is genetically and biologically unrelated to the child. Is the child a beneficiary of the trust? In In re Doe, 1 a New York court struggled with this issue, one likely to arise again as multigenerational trusts collide with new ways of creating children. This Article will for the first time explore the interpretation of dynasty trusts established either when courts presumed the settlor intended to exclude adoptees as beneficiaries or with express language excluding adoptees. Assisted insemination, in vitro fertilization, the use of gestational carriers, and the dispositive instrument." 4 Forty years earlier, an article in the Michigan Law Review made a similar point: "Express reference to relations by 'blood' naturally points to exclusion of one related by adoption only." 5 The exception at common law was for a spouse, and then only for personal property; fearful of land being transmitted out of the family in a society ruled by primogeniture, a widow or widower was entitled only to a life estate in real property of dower or curtesy. 6 Until the advent of ART in the 1950s, these assumptions-that children and grandchildren were blood relatives, and those adopted were not-were largely true. The woman who gave birth was always the genetic mother before the advent of in vitro fertilization, and so determining maternity was simple: as Justice Kennedy observed, "In the case of the mother the [parent-child] relation is verifiable from the birth itself." 7 Determining paternity was more difficult, but in the case of a married woman, the common law generally presumed that the husband was the father, and usually that assumption was correct. There were exceptions, of course. If the wife had an extramarital affair, the child would not be genetically related to the husband. The ancient Romans recognized this risk; as soon as the wife notified her husband that she was pregnant, he was required "to send guards or to give notice to her that she is not pregnant by him . . . ." 8 Otherwise, he "is compelled to acknowledge the offspring." 9 The guards likely were to "[p]revent a changeling from being passed off as the husband's child." 10 But the assumption that the husband was the child's father was likely correct in the vast majority of cases. A recent metasurvey of sixty-seven previous studies of nonpaternity concluded that the nonpaternity rate was only 3.3%, 11 meaning that ninety-seven out of one hundred children were fathered by their mother's husband, and only three were not. A smaller study in one city found a nonpaternity rate of just 3.7%. 12 Thus, before adoption, assisted insemination, and in vitro fertilization, a trust for one's "children," 4. Rein, supra note 2, at 713 (citation omitted). For similar reasons, unadopted stepchildren do not inherit in intestacy in most states. MCGOVERN ET AL., supra note 3, at 115 (citing UNIF. PROB. CODE § 1-201(5) and RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 2.5 cmt. j (1997) 13. "Children" and "grandchildren" are single-generational terms, while "descendants" is a multigenerational term. See, e.g., CAL. PROB. CODE § 6205 (2015) ("'Descendants' mean children, grandchildren, and their lineal descendants of all generations.").
14. This statement is supported by the cases cited throughout this Section. See infra notes 15-114.
15. As in note 14, the statements within this sentence are supported by the cases cited throughout Section II. 16. "Issue" and "heirs" are multigenerational terms. "Issue" is synonymous with "descendants" and thus encompasses children, grandchildren, and so on. "Heirs" means "heirs in intestacy," and indicates the persons designated to receive a decedent's property when there is no valid will. WILLIAM M. MCGOVERN adopted has the rights of a child with out being a child." 19 Thus, the three adoptees were not entitled to take from the settlor's trust because they did not meet the description of being his daughter's children. 20 Similarly, a testator who died in 1891 had provided in his will for his children, and should one of his children die leaving a child or children, that child would receive the same share as his parent. 21 One son died leaving a daughter whom he had adopted in 1882, eight years before the testator's 1890 will, but the court found that the adoptee did not qualify as his child, citing "a presumption that the testator intended 'child or children' of his own blood, and did not intend his estate to go to a stranger to his blood." 22 These early courts also struggled with the legal effects of adopting a child beyond the obvious one of inheritance. States that imposed an inheritance tax typically exempted a child's share or taxed it at a lower rate. In Pennsylvania in 1859, for example, children and other lineal descendants were exempt from the inheritance tax, but an adopted child still paid the tax: "Giving an adopted son a right to inherit, does not make him a son in fact." 23 A statute that provided a share for a child born after the execution of the testator's last will did not apply to a child adopted after the will because the adoption did not make the person a child of the adopter. 24 A state's anti-lapse statute, applicable in cases in which a child failed to survive a testator, did not apply to an adoptee, again because adoption did not make her a "child in fact." 25 The Supreme Court of Hawaii in 1939 considered the settlor's intent in giving the remainder of a trust to the life tenant's "lawful issue." 26 The Court observed that "the general rule of construction throughout the United States and England" was that "issue," when used in a will or trust instrument, was presumed In Russell v. Russell, the Supreme Court of Alabama held that an 1870 will giving two-thirds of the estate to Russell's "children" did not include a child the testator adopted in 1885: "Though by adoption he is treated 'as a child,' he is not the child of the testator, and, it is manifest, he was not in contemplation when the testator made his will." 3 So. 900, 901 (1888). Almost 100 years later, the court disavowed Russell, stating that "the language of the opinion [ to mean "children of the blood" and thus excluded adoptees. 27 However, Hawaii's ancient customs and longstanding use of adoption proved to be an exception to the rule. In O'Brien v. Walker, a trust created by settlors who were part-Hawaiian (the husband) and Hawaiian (the wife) blood, and who had lived in Hawaii all their lives, was presumed to include adoptees as "issue" unless the trust and surrounding circumstances indicated that was not the settlors' intent. 28 The court emphasized the unique history of Hawaii, including its adoption statute enacted in 1841, ten years before the Massachusetts statute, and concluded that "Hawaii's legal heritage is more comparable to the civil law which recognizes adoptions, than to the common law which does not." 29 Texas trusts created by a family in the 1940s provided for interests to be paid to "children" and "heirs of the body." 30 First construing the word "children," the Supreme Court of Texas found that an adopted person was ordinarily excluded from that class "unless a contrary intent is disclosed by additional language or circumstances." 31 To presume otherwise would allow "the designated parent to have power, by adopting any person he may choose, in effect to appoint the subject matter of the conveyance to such person." 32 The court's conclusion was further bolstered by its reading of the trusts to use the words "children" and "issue" interchangeably, "and the latter term clearly connotes blood relationship." 33 The court, citing the Restatement of the Law of Property, similarly concluded that "'heirs of [the] body[ ]' . . . ordinarily embraces only lineal blood descendants of the designated person." 34 Thus, because the settlor's intention at the time the trusts were created determines who is included in the class of "children" and "heirs of the body," the adopted children were excluded from the trust. 35 Similarly, in 1963 the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine was asked to decide the meaning of "issue" in a testamentary trust created in 1933 for the benefit of the testator's children for life, and then to their issue. 36 One of the testator's sons had adopted a child (as with Cutrer, his stepson) shortly before the testator's death. 37 Citing the "stranger to the adoption" rule, the court noted that "issue" usually connotes a blood relationship, although since the word was used in a will, the intention of the testator was paramount. 38 Still, the presumption applied that the testator "did not intend his estate to go to a stranger to his blood" 39 -that is, an adoptee. A second question courts faced in ascertaining the meaning of the words used in the will or trust was whether the court should apply current law, or the law at the time the document became effective. Absent express language in the statute otherwise, courts routinely chose the latter and continue to do so today. 40 One exception was in Alabama; in construing the intent of a testator who died in 1909, the Supreme Court of Alabama applied the more modern presumption that in the absence of a contrary intent, the adopted child is included in class terms such as "child" or "children." 41 In some cases, this decision to use the earlier law meant the court must construe a trust written decades ago. In Matter of Duke, a 1924 trust provided for the settlor's daughter, the heiress Doris Duke, for her life, then for "her lineal descendants." 42 In 1988, Ms. Duke adopted Chandi Heffner, then thirty-five years old, under New Jersey's adult adoption statute. 43 After Ms. Duke died in 1993, Ms. Heffner sought a court order that she was entitled to income from the trust, whose principal was estimated to be worth $170,000,000, as Ms. Duke's sole surviving descendant. 44 The court held that "the plain and only meaning" of the trust was that New Jersey law from 1924 must be used, and that law did not allow adult adoptees to take as lineal descendants. 46 Similarly, a Texas court interpreting the term "descendants" in a 1982 trust held that the term was not ambiguous, and thus adult adoptees did not take from a third party's trust. 47 Despite the fact that Texas amended its statute in 1951 to say that adoptees were included unless the instrument clearly excluded them, 48 some Texas courts, like the court in Ellison, still found an intent to exclude adoptees from class gifts. For example, a 1954 trust that provided for children of the settlor's granddaughter "including any other great grandchildren who may be born after my death" was found to specifically exclude adopted great grandchildren because the testator "intended the word 'born' to mean children born to his granddaughter." 49 In ascertaining the settlor's intent whether to include adoptees in class terms, a court might look at the laws of intestacy at the time the trust came into effect, either on the theory that the settlor was bound to know the existing law, 50 or because the settlor expressly directed the court to look at that law. But it turns out the impact of adoption on intestacy law was extraordinarily complex. As adoption is purely a creature of statute, being unknown at common law, the precise effects of an adoption varied widely from state to state depending on the exact language of the statute. One author opined, "There is probably more activity in the case and statutory law and in the writing upon the subject to inheritance by reason of 46 [I] t is presumed that the instrument was executed in the light of knowledge of the then existing adoption law."). One court went even further to construe a will as including adult adoptees despite the fact that the will was executed sixteen years before such adoptions were legal in the state. Matter of Estate of Fortney, 611 P.2d 599 (Kan. Ct. App. 1980). In this case, a 1922 will created life estates for Elizabeth and John Fortney, and provided that if "both die without heirs by birth, or by adoption," the property would go to specified persons. Id. at 601 (emphasis added). After Kansas allowed adult adoptions in 1939, John, at age 90, adopted his wife's nephew, age 65, in 1975. Id. at 600. The court held that the testator was bound to know that the statute was subject to change by the legislature. Id. at 599. adoption than in any other aspect of the law of intestacy." 51 Tiffany and Cooley's 1909 treatise observed that " [b] y the act of adoption, the child becomes, in a legal sense, the child of the adoptive parent. The general effect of the adoption, therefore is, with few exceptions, to place the parties in the legal relation of parent and child, with all the legal consequences." 52 The right of inheritance, however, was much more complicated. The statute might provide that the child inherits from the adoptive parent, or the child might have no inheritance rights. 53 Even if the child were an heir of the adoptive parent, in most states at that time "he cannot take, by representation, from the adoptive parent's kindred, either lineal or collateral." 54 This is often called the "stranger to the adoption" rule. 55 As one Missouri court stated, "The blood tie is the open sesame to unlock the treasure of inheritance." 56 While ordinarily a child adopted by the testator would inherit under her will, a court might find otherwise: for example, in a 1909 Iowa will giving the residue to "my lawful heirs," the court found that the testator used the phrase to mean heirs of the blood and not her adopted daughter. 57 Treatises and cases also parsed the difference between "heirs of the body" and "issue" noting that the terms are not synonymous. 58 the grantor or testator is the adopting parent, it is reasonable to presume that the adopted child was within the intended bounty of such grantor or testator; but, where he is a stranger to the adoption such presumption does not prevail."); In re Haight, 118 N.Y.S. 745, 746 (Sur. Ct. 1909) ("As between foster parent and adopted child the statute gives the right of inheritance . . . . But this right has never been extended, by statute or judicial interpretation, to the child to inherit from the collateral kin of the foster parent . . . ."); In re Estate of Edwards, 273 N.W.2d 118, 119-20 (S.D. 1978) (finding that an adopted child does not inherit from anyone but the adoptive parents themselves "is in line with the great weight of authority from other jurisdictions."). But cf. In re Estate of Coe, 201 A.2d 571, 575 (N.J. 1964) (holding that a 1897 will with a bequest to a person's "lawful children" included adoptees on the grounds that "[w]e cannot believe it probable that strangers to the adoption would differentiate between the natural child and the adopted child of another."). Ahlemeyer is distinguished because it was a deed, not a will. 131 A. 54, 56 (Sup. Ct. 1925), aff 'd, 137 A. 543 (1927) . For a discussion of the history of the "stranger-to-the-adoption" rule, see Naomi there is "a strong tendency to treat 'issue' as equivalent to heirs of the body" and thus exclude adoptees, while some courts have held the terms are not synonymous and thus included adoptees. 60 A Texas court in 1986 stated that "[i]n the ordinary and usual sense, the term 'issue' clearly connotes a blood relationship," although "the term is not as strong a word of limitation as are 'heirs of the body.'" 61 Still, a later Texas case held that the public policy of the state was to treat adopted children in the same manner as children, and thus, terms such as "issue" or "bodily issue," even though they generally refer to blood relationships, should be construed to mean adopted persons, including adult adoptees, unless the will or trust expressly excludes them. 62 While the Restatement (First) of Property defined "issue" and "descendants" as related by blood, 63 the Restatement (Second) of Property followed its expanded meaning of "children" to include those adopted to apply as well to "issue" and "descendants." 64 Both the pre-1990 Uniform Probate Code section 2-611, 65 and sections 2-705 and 2-114 of the 1990 Uniform Probate Code include adopted persons in class terms. 66 Some trusts would expressly direct the court to apply intestacy law. For example, a New Jersey trust created in 1924 provided for the settlor and his wife for their lives, and then directed the trust fund to be paid "to the next of kin of the Settlor according to the laws of the State of New Jersey in force at this date providing for the distribution of the personal estate of persons dying intestate." 67 Shortly after his wife's death in 1940, the settlor adopted his wife's son by a prior marriage (the settlor's stepson), then age thirty, and two years later adopted his stepson's four-year-old daughter. 68 Because New Jersey law did not allow adult adoptions until 1925, a year after the trust was created, the court found that the adopted daughter was the sole heir in intestacy, and thus received the entire trust fund. 69 INST. 1987) . If the adopted person's parent was not the donor, then the Restatement (Second) required that the parent either raise the child or contemplate that the child will be raised by him or her. Id. § 25.4(2). In addition to adoptees, the Restatement (Second) also included nonmarital children and ART children in these terms. If a trust was found to exclude adopted children, could one argue a violation of the Privileges and Immunities Clause? In Lutz v. Fortune, a will executed in 1939 created a trust providing for the testator's children and grandchildren, but if one of the grandchildren "should die prior to the termination of this trust leaving a child or children . . . , then such child or children . . . shall take" that grandchild's share. 70 In 1968, one of the grandchildren, Evie Lutz, adopted her husband's grandchild; Evie died two years later survived by the one adopted child. 71 The trust finally ended in 1997 when the testator's last surviving child died at the age of 109. 72 Applying the law in effect in 1942 when the testator died, the court concluded that the testator did not intend to include an adopted child when he referred to his grandchildren's "child or children" because " [t] here is nothing in Fortune's will or in extraneous circumstances that would rebut the presumption that Fortune intended to exclude adopted children." 73 Further, the court found no violation of the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Indiana Constitution because the complained-of action was not by the State but rather by a private individual. 74 Similarly, a testamentary trust created in Georgia in 1945 was held to presumptively exclude adopted children. 75 The adopted great-grandsons argued that a statutory presumption favoring those within the testator's bloodline violated the Equal Protection clause of the U.S. Constitution and Article I, Section II, Part II of the Georgia State Constitution, a claim rejected by the Supreme Court of Georgia. 76 "As long as these distinctions are rationally related to the state's interest in seeking the most orderly system possible for passing title from one person to another so that the state knows at all times exactly what is owned by whom, then the distinctions are constitutionally sound." 77 The presumption that adoptees were excluded from various class terms aligned with another assumption that courts occasionally articulated in the midtwentieth century: a settlor would not want to create a virtual power of appointment in his beneficiaries by giving them the option to adopt strangers into the class. 78 [ Vol. 7:545 No one can read the cases on this subject without soon becoming aware of what for the most part is an unexpressed but nonetheless perceptible attitude of fear on the part of courts that, unless they guard well against it, the institution of adoption may be an implement of selfadvancement, fraud or spite in the hands of adopters seeking to use it deliberately to meet the requirements of an instrument, such as a will, that the adopters have children. 79 As a New York court opined in determining that language contingent on the life tenant, Thomas C. Hoagland, "leaving no children surviving him" excluded any children he adopted, "[o]ther language would have been used if [the testator] had intended thus to confer upon Thomas C. Hoagland a virtual power of appointment." 80 Similarly, a North Carolina court, in construing the testator's intent, considered whether the person had been adopted before or after the testator's death, and concluded, "a child adopted by such person after the testator's death does not take." 81 The court noted, "To hold otherwise would make it possible for property of a testator to be diverted to strangers of his blood without his knowledge or consent." 82 A California Court of Appeal, in rejecting the claims of potential beneficiaries adopted as adults years after the testamentary trust became effective, concluded that "[i]f [the testator] had wished to give his daughter power of appointment, he could have done so." 83 Construing a trust in Missouri which gave the income to the settlor's daughter for life, then the principal to the daughter's children, the court refused to include a child adopted by the daughter nine years after the testator died, stating, "one who has a life estate cannot convey away the remainder by a deed of adoption any more than by a deed in any other form." 84 This fear of creating a virtual power in a beneficiary is not unfounded. Several cases illustrate how willing beneficiaries are to adopt someone in order to allow them to benefit from the trust, and some courts' willingness to go along with this option.
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In Levien v. Johnson, a 1979 testamentary trust established for the benefit of the testator's descendants provided that, after paying the income to the testator's grandchildren for a period of time, the trust would be distributed in equal shares to 79 The court rejected claims that the adoptions were unique and unforeseeable, a sham, or acted to defeat the rights of the remainder beneficiaries, and allowed the two adopted adults to take as part of the class. 89 In a second case, testator Amos Evans gave the remainder of his property to his daughter Rebecca, but provided, "[i]n the event that all of my children . . . shall die without issue living at the time of their death . . . then I give devise and bequeath the said rest and remainder . . . unto my brothers James H. Evans and William S. Evans and their heirs . . . ." 90 In 1970, Rebecca wanted to sell the property but her buyer rejected the title due to the "gift over" language. 91 A legal research service suggested that an adoption might solve the problem, so at age seventy-six, Rebecca and her husband adopted a married neighbor, and the sale was completed. 92 To be on the safe side, three years later, Rebecca and her husband adopted a second adult, a first cousin on her mother's side, stating that her reason to adopt was "on account of this land in Maryland." 93 A third example is found in a recent Delaware case. In Otto v. Gore, a trust beneficiary tried to increase her children's share of the principal by adopting her ex-husband, the father of her children, on his promise to give any part of the principal he received to their children. 95 The scheme might have worked, but the court found that an irrevocable trust had been created at an earlier date and so the beneficiaries could not be altered. 96 In yet another example, the Supreme Court of Minnesota granted the petition of a twenty-nine-year-old man to adopt his fifty-three-year-old mother in order to make her his heir and thus (he hoped) qualify her as a beneficiary of a trust created by her ex-husband, although the court noted that "[t]he interpretation of the trust must be decided in other proceedings directly presenting that issue." 97 A few states have statutes that preclude someone from creating a new beneficiary through an adult adoption. When the adopting parent is not the creator of the trust, will or other instrument, the adoptee is included only if he or she lived while a minor as a regular member of the household of the adopting parent or of that parent's parent, brother, sister, or surviving spouse. 98 This is a variation on the old "stranger to the adoption" rule, which established a parent-child relationship only between the adopter and the adoptee, but did not extend that relationship to other relatives. 99 As one court observed, "There is no such person as a grandchild by adoption." 100 The first adoption statutes rarely provided for inheritance between anyone other than the adopter and the adoptee; it was not until the 1950s that about twenty states had such laws. 101 New York, for a time, was especially concerned with an adoption for the purpose of defeating the rights of a remainderperson, and thus an 1887 statute refused to recognize an adoptee in that instance in order to prevent "fraud." 102 Former Section 115 of New York's Domestic Relations Law, which applied to wills of those dying before March 1, 1964, provided, "As respects the passing and limitation over of real or personal property dependent under the provisions of any instrument on the foster parent dying without heirs, the foster child is not deemed the child of the foster parent so as to defeat the rights of the remaindermen." 103 Thus, one of the settlor's sons was treated as having no surviving children, despite his adoption of an eleven-year-old child. 104 On occasion a court may balk at recognizing an adult adoptee on public policy grounds. A 1932 Kentucky trust paid income to the testator's husband and to her three sons, and on the death of the last surviving beneficiary, was to pay the principal to her "then surviving heirs, according to the laws of descent and distribution then in force in Kentucky . . . ." 105 One of the sons had no issue but in 1959 adopted his wife, and she survived him. 106 The court found the adoption to be "an act of subterfuge which in effect thwarts the intent of the ancestor whose property is being distributed and cheats the rightful heirs," and thus refused to allow the wife to take. 107 In a Colorado case of first impression, a 1956 trust created in Illinois provided that, on the death of the settlor's son, the trust would be divided into equal shares among his living children, and stated that "child" and "descendant" includes "persons legally adopted by my said son." 108 The son had three children with his first wife. In 1979, four years after the settlor died, the son adopted his second wife. 109 Despite the trust language to treat adoptees as beneficiaries, the court held that the son was using adoption "contrary to the intent of the settlor as set forth in the instrument." 110 Similarly, a New Jersey court held that a trust beneficiary's adoption of his forty-one-year-old stepson was "an abuse of the adoption process and of the will and a violation of testator's intent" amounting to fraud. 111 While the "primary motive" for the adoption was to benefit the beneficiary's wife and stepson by making them eligible for the trust remainder, "[t]his motive necessarily involved the motive to divert the remainder" from the beneficiary's nieces and nephews, who had the gift over. 112 1983 ) (holding that the fifty-five-year-old daughter's adoption of her forty-two-year-old cousin in order to make the cousin a trust beneficiary was "an abuse of the adoption process and where the end result would violate the [ Vol. 7:545 Missouri has allowed adult adoptions for over one hundred years, and the trust contained language defining "issue" as including "an adopted child or children," the court balked when a beneficiary adopted his secretary and her son, his nephew, and three friends so that they could benefit from the trust. 114 "Common sense tells us that [the settlor], by inserting adopted children into the class she described as Neilson's 'issue,' intended to include only individuals with some familial bond to her family-individuals to whom Neilson felt a familial bond of love and duty." 115
III. TWO MAJOR CHANGES IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY: MULTIGENERATIONAL TRUSTS AND ASSISTED REPRODUCTION
At common law, a settlor could provide for her children and grandchildren in a trust, even stipulating that the grandchildren must reach the age of twenty-one, but the Rule Against Perpetuities ended the trust after that. 116 In addition to preventing nonvested interests from floating through time indefinitely, thus making title unmarketable, 117 the Rule allowed "dead hand" control only for the lives of those known to the settlor (such as her children) plus the period of minority of their children (the settlor's grandchildren). 118 Perhaps more importantly for multigenerational trusts, the Rule also required all classes to close, and all conditions precedent to be satisfied by each member of that class, within that period. 119 Thus, at common law, a trust created by A's parent that provided for A for life, then to A's children for their lives, and then the principal to be distributed to A's grandchildren, was void as to the grandchildren, because it could not be guaranteed that the class of A's grandchildren would close within A's life plus twenty-one years. 120 Similarly, a trust that specified a condition for the grandchildren to meet could cause problems. Suppose the trust required each grandchild to reach the age of twenty-five years before the principal could be distributed. Under the "all or settlor's probable intent and normal expectations."). Similarly, in Rhay v. Johnson, a beneficiary adopted a sixty-five-year-old friend, the court stated, "the motivation for adopting Mr. Rhay was in part to affect the result under the Sheltons' testamentary remainder plan," which gave the principal to the issue of the body of the beneficiary-adopter. 867 P.2d 669, 674 (Wash. Ct. App. 1994 120. Why is A the measuring life, and not A's children, assuming A had children when the trust was created? The "fertile octogenarian" doctrine presumed that A would have another child after the trust was created, and that the later-born child would be the last child to die well after the deaths of A and the rest of A's children, thus belatedly closing the class of grandchildren. Id. at 877.
nothing" rule, even if we could close the class of grandchildren within the time limit, we would still need to guarantee that every possible grandchild would reach the age of twenty-five, or die, within that same time limit.
Starting with Pennsylvania in 1947, 121 a number of states modified the common law rule to allow beneficiaries to "wait and see" if a violation of RAP occurred, rather than destroy the interest at the outset because a violation might occur. Reform truly accelerated with a change in federal tax law in 1986, which enabled tax savings if one created a series of income interests (also known as "life estates"), which typically are found in a trust. Robert Sitkoff and Max Schanzenbach's comprehensive analysis of these changes noted,
As the practicing bar digested the [Tax Reform] Act [of 1986] and grasped the nature of the . . . tax, it became apparent that making use of the transferor's exemption in a perpetual trust had significant long-term tax advantages . . . . Given prevailing choice-of-law principles and the shift in the nature of wealth from land to financial assets (making trust assets portable), it was only a matter of time until jurisdictional competition sparked a race to abolish the Rule Against Perpetuities. 122 Today, companies tout their state's laws allowing perpetual trusts. When asked why it might be important to establish a trust in South Dakota, Liberty National Bank answered, "unlike most states whose trust laws limit how long a trust can last, South Dakota is one of the few states that have no such time limits; therefore, your properly established South Dakota trust can remain active and grow forever." 123 In considering "Delaware vs. Texas-Which is Better For Trusts?" author Jim Dossey notes that Delaware allows a perpetual trust for personal property, while Texas still follows the Rule Against Perpetuities, yet concludes, "If someone wants a dynasty trust, there are other states such as Alaska or Nevada that are better." 124 Today, trusts that once would have ended with grandchildren can now go on for generations, requiring courts to continue to interpret what a long-dead settlor would have wanted decades-or even possibly centuries-ago.
The second recent change to consider is assisted reproductive technology (ART). With the advent of assisted insemination in the twentieth century, 125 presumption that a child of the marriage was genetically related to the parents, and an adopted child was not, became more muddled. The first assisted reproduction technique, assisted (or artificial) insemination (AI), allowed a woman to become pregnant noncoitally through the direct injection of sperm into her cervix or uterus via a device such as syringe. As a result, the man to whom she was married might be the genetic father of the child if his sperm was used (termed "assisted insemination by husband," or AIH), or he might not if donor sperm was used ("assisted insemination by donor," or AID). While the common law generally assumed that a child born to a married woman was the child of her husband, 126 early cases struggled with the status of these AI children and their parents. An Illinois case held that a woman who used AID with or without her husband's consent had committed adultery, and thus the resulting child was illegitimate. 127 Other courts found that if the husband had consented to the procedure, the doctrine of equitable estoppel applied so that he must support the child. 128 California declared in 1968 that a child conceived through AID "does not have a 'natural father,' as that terms [sic] is commonly used" and sought a "lawful father" instead, who they found in a husband who had consented in writing to his wife's insemination for the purpose of creating a child. 129 Some of these issues were resolved in section 5 of the 1973 Uniform Parentage Act (UPA), which provided that the child was the legal offspring of a husband who had consented to his wife's insemination, as long as the donor sperm was provided to a licensed physician. 130 A number of states adopted updated versions of the UPA, which deleted the word "married" so that the statute applied to an unmarried woman who uses assisted insemination, 131 In 1979, the New England Journal of Medicine published a survey on physician use of assisted insemination, resulting in a dramatic increase in the practice. 133 A government survey of physicians and medical fertility societies in 1987 estimated that 172,000 women used artificial insemination in 1986-87, resulting in approximately 65,000 live births, with 54% using artificial insemination by husband (AIH) (35,000 births) and the rest using artificial insemination by donor (AID) (30,000 births) .
A woman's ability to give birth to a child not genetically related to her came about in 1973 in England with the first "test tube baby," Louise Brown; 134 three years later, America's first in vitro fertilization (IVF) baby was born after forty-one tries. 135 With IVF, the egg and the sperm are combined in the laboratory and allowed to develop into a pre-embryo, which is then implanted in a woman's uterus. 136 Because both the egg and the sperm must be handled outside the body, either one (or both) can come from a donor. Today, more than 1.5% of all babies born in the United States are conceived via IVF. 137 With ART commonly in use today, there are several ways a parent might have no genetic connection to his or her child, and ways an adoptive parent might be the genetic parent of the child he or she adopts.
First, thousands of women each year use assisted insemination by donor. 138 If these women have a male partner, he presumably knows he is not the genetic father of the child, although the child may not know that, nor may the rest of the family. But it turns out that many couples who thought they were contracting for insemination with the husband's sperm were not getting what they bargained for. Sometimes the mixing of the husband's sperm with donor sperm was deliberate; other times it was a mistake. When doctors first began to offer AI, the practice was unregulated, making errors and deliberate substitutions easier to occur. In 1959, a common practice of doctors using AIH was to mix donor sperm in with the husband's sperm in order to increase the chances of conception. 139 By 1979, this practice had apparently mostly ended; in a 1977-1978 survey of physicians performing artificial insemination by donor, of the 471 respondents, only two doctors replied that they mixed donor semen with the husband's semen. 140 However, others continued to deliberately mix sperm. A sperm bank founder in Great Britain is suspected of fathering as many as 600 children by secretly using his own sperm at his London-based clinic from the 1940s through the 1960s. 141 In 1992, Cecil Jacobson, a Virginia doctor, was found guilty on fifty-two counts of fraud and perjury in a case in which he substituted his own sperm in place of a donor. 142 A couple sued a Connecticut doctor alleging he used his own sperm rather than the patient's husband's after a DNA test performed in 2004 indicated that the husband was not the biological father. The suit was quickly settled. 143 In 2014, a Utah couple who had contracted with a fertility clinic for AIH discovered through a DNA test that their twenty-one-year-old daughter was not related to her father, but was likely related to a deceased part-time employee of the clinic. 144 News reports and cases also contain evidence in which embryos have been deliberately switched, so that the pregnant woman is misled regarding the identity of those providing the gametic material. A widely reported scandal occurred at a University of California, Irvine fertility clinic in 1995. Dr. Ricardo Asch and his partner at UCI's Center for Reproductive Health, Dr. Jose Balmaceda, were allegedly appropriating the embryos of patients for use in other infertile patients without the knowledge or consent of any of the parties involved. 145 The result was that infertile women gave birth to the genetic children of other infertile couples seeking help from the clinic. 146 The above examples all involved the deliberate substitution of another's genetic material. Sperm and embryos have also been switched by mistake according to news reports and court cases. In 1992, a woman alleged that a doctor told her minutes after her AI that she was mistakenly given the sperm of an unknown donor rather than her husband's sperm; the suit was settled. 147 In 1995, a couple in Florida using IVF was informed ten days after their twins were born that the wrong sperm was used to fertilize the wife's ova; they filed suit in 1996, alleging the mistake "has torn their lives apart." 148 In 2013, a Canadian doctor was reprimanded and suspended from practice after admitting that he had used the wrong semen to impregnate three women. 149 One of the three children born as a result discovered when he was twenty-three-years old that his father's sperm had not been used in the procedure but instead an unknown man's, with the result that his medical history was unknown. 150 mix-up occurred in New York in 1998, when an embryo containing the Rogerses' genetic material was implanted in Donna Fasano along with a second embryo containing the Fasanos's genetic material. 153 Less than two months after the IVF procedure, both couples were notified of the mistake, and later that year, Donna Fasano gave birth to two babies: the Rogerses' genetic child and her own genetic child. 154 While the Fasanos agreed to relinquish custody of the first child to the Rogerses, they insisted on visitation rights, resulting in a lawsuit by the Rogerses. 155 While such mistakes are rare, they do occur. Just as with babies switched at birth at the hospital, 156 154. Id. The trial court enforced the parties' agreement allowing visitation by the Fasanos, but the appellate court reversed and denied visitation. Rejecting the Rogerses' argument that the case should be decided on the fact that the Fasanos were "genetic strangers" to the Rogerses' child, the court found that a "gestational mother" might have some rights under New York law. Id. at 71-73. However, in this case, the court found that "any bonding on the part of Akeil [Rogers] to his gestational mother and her family was the direct result of the Fasanos' failure to take timely action upon being informed of the clinic's admitted error. Defendants [Fasanos] cannot be permitted to purposefully act in such a way as to create a bond, and then rely upon it for their assertion of rights to which they would not otherwise be entitled." Id. and her newborn child are different races, 157 as was the case with Donna Fasano in New York and Mrs. A in Leeds, the mistake is certain to be detected. It's possible that other mix-ups or deliberate substitutions have occurred that have never been discovered.
In addition to all these instances in which a presumed parent in fact has no genetic connection to the child, there are a number of times in ART when a genetic parent adopts his or her own child, further blurring the line between a "natural born child" and an "adopted child." While a genetic parent might occasionally adopt his or her own naturally conceived child, 158 the incidence is infrequent enough that courts are still willing to maintain the presumption that an adopted child is not one's genetic child. But in ART, such children are routinely adopted. Consider these three scenarios:
Scenario A: Ann is diagnosed with cancer; the recommended medical treatment is likely to destroy her fertility. She opts to cryopreserve her ova, fertilized with her husband's sperm, before she undergoes treatment. Later, she and her husband enter into an agreement with a gestational carrier, who is implanted with the pre-embryo that Ann and her husband cryopreserved, and successfully gives birth. While some states are willing to enter a pre-birth order declaring that Ann and her husband are the parents, making adoption unnecessary, 159 in several states both Ann and her husband must adopt the resulting child even though they are the genetic parents, because another woman gave birth to the child and is therefore the Scenario C: Clarice is in a committed relationship with her female partner, Debbie, but is not married to her. 164 The couple uses Clarice's egg and anonymously donated sperm to create a pre-embryo that is implanted in Debbie, who gives birth to the child. Debbie will be presumed the mother because she gave birth and she is not a gestational carrier; she intends to parent the child along with Clarice. But because Clarice is not married to Debbie, she may need to adopt the baby, even though she is the genetic mother. 165 Even if Clarice is married to Debbie, she might still adopt the child in an abundance of caution. 166 Such a case occurred with Mona A. and Ingrid A., a New York couple who were legally married in the Netherlands in 2004. 167 The couple later used IVF to fertilize Mona's ova with anonymously donated sperm; the pre-embryo was implanted in Ingrid, who gave birth to a child in 2008. 168 The birth certificate listed only Ingrid as a parent, although both Ingrid and Mona lived together and raised Sebastian. While New York law recognized the foreign same-sex marriage, and thus considered Sebastian to be Mona's child as well as Ingrid's, Mona sought to adopt him because, "Unfortunately, while this is the case in New York, the same recognition and protection of Mona's parental rights does not currently exist in the rest of this country, or in most other nations in the world." 169 The judicial decree of adoption, unlike the marriage, would be entitled to full faith and credit in other states. 170 
IV. CURRENT LAW ON WHETHER ADOPTEES ARE INCLUDED IN CLASS GIFTS
Today in many states, once a person is adopted, he or she will be included in classes such as "issue," "descendants," or "grandchildren" established by the adopter's relatives, unless the will or trust expresses a contrary intent. 171 California construed Jane Stanford's 1905 will and trust to include adoptees, concluding that, "It has been the policy of this state, at least since the adoption of the Civil Code, to accord to adopted children the same status as natural children." 172 The Supreme Court of California acknowledged the possibility that adoption could be used for "avaricious or spiteful purposes" but found the likelihood of such use to be "slight under modern adoption statutes contemplating a thorough investigation into such matters as the motives of the prospective adopter." 173 Recently, the Nebraska Supreme Court recognized an adult adoptee as the sole trust beneficiary despite the adoptee's testimony that one goal of the adoption was to prevent the other beneficiaries from receiving it should the adopter die childless, and the adoptee was instructed by his adopter to keep the adoption secret. 174 The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania had at one time found a presumption that testators and settlors intended to exclude adoptees, 175 but reversed itself a few years later to "adopt a presumption that the testator intended to include any 'child' or 'children' who were adopted." 176 The court noted the new position might not be a majority but had been accepted by many jurisdictions, citing cases from California, District of Columbia, Kentucky, Minnesota, New Jersey, New York, and Ohio. 177 Recent cases in Georgia, Maine and Iowa have also held that a will or trust that refers to "children," "grandchildren," "issue," and similar group terms includes those adopted into the class. 178 The states with statutory form wills make this clear. For example, Michigan includes the following statement in the "definitions" section: "'Descendants' or 'children' includes . . . individuals legally adopted . . . ." 179 Both the Wisconsin "basic will" and the "basic will with trust" include this notice: "This will treats adopted children as if they are birth children." 180 Massachusetts and New Mexico have enacted the Uniform Statutory Will Act, which states in its definitional section that "an adopted individual is the child of the adopting parents and not of the natural parents, but an individual adopted by the spouse of a natural parent is also the child of either natural parent." 181 Because "issue" is determined at each generation by using the definition of "child," the term would include all adopted-in persons. 182 California at one time had a statutory will with trust which stated, unhelpfully, "This will treats most adopted children as if they are natural children," 183 but that section has been repealed; today, California has only a statutory form will, which has no information about the status of adopted children. 184 
Solution 1: How to Draft a Trust Now that May Include ART Children?
A trust or will drafted today will presumptively include adoptees in all class gifts. As noted, this effectively gives a power of appointment to some beneficiaries, who can create a "grandchild" or other relative by adopting a friend or spouse. The first, and most important step, is for the drafter to discuss with the client what s/he means by terms such as "children" or "descendants." Professor Featherston's #1 drafting tip is, Define who are the remainder beneficiaries: For example, what does the settlor actually mean in the use of terms like "children," "grandchildren," "descendants," "issues," or "nieces or nephews"? Are step-children, nonmarital children, scientifically generated descendants, pretermitted children, adopted children and adults who are adopted as adults to be included within those terms? 185 Similarly, Murphy's Will Clauses advises, During the estate planning conference, the client is asked, or should be asked, the details regarding the members of the client's family . . . . It is important to consider whether the client wishes to include or exclude children adopted into or out of the family, children born out of wedlock, children of a spouse and another individual, or otherwise, including children conceived via assisted insemination or gestational surrogate. 186 Some trusts include express language to the effect that "adoptions shall not be recognized" for the purpose of ascertaining beneficiaries. A phrase such as, "The terms 'child,' 'children,' and 'issue' as used in this instrument are [intended/not intended] to include adopted persons and their issue" 187 could be incorporated into the trust. When a clause excluding adoptees is incorporated, the settlors may be especially interested in confining the benefits of the trust to blood relatives, thus excluding stepchildren, foster children, and others; they may also be worried about a beneficiary using the absence of such language as a virtual power of appointment. However, because of ART, excluding adoptees will not guarantee either that all beneficiaries are blood related (because children or grandchildren may have been conceived with donor sperm or ova, but not adopted), or that those who are adopted are not blood related, as discussed in Part III. If a settlor is only troubled by the second concern, that allowing adoptions gives a beneficiary a virtual power of appointment, the phrase is often modified to exclude only those adopted as adults or after a specified age, such as fourteen, or to exclude those who did not live in a parent-child relationship with the adopter as a minor. For example, a trust might specify that "[a] child adopted before he or she attains eighteen (18) years of age (but not after attaining that age) shall be treated under this Trust Agreement as a child of his or her adopting parents and a descendant of their ancestors." 188 While language excluding adult adoptees will have the desired results of including ART children and curtailing the use of adoption as a power of appointment, it may also have an unintended effect in the case of stepchildren and foster children. A stepparent may wish to adopt his or her spouse's children with another partner, but may be unable to do so because that partner objects to their adoption. Once the stepchild reaches the age of majority, the stepparent no longer needs the consent of the stepchild's other parent, and the adoption can proceed, but only as an adult adoption. Similar complications may arise with a foster child. Thus, language that focuses on whether the adopter and adoptee have a parentchild relationship might be preferable to an age cutoff. For example, in interpreting class gifts made by a transferor who is not the adoptive parent, California by statute excludes adoptees unless they lived while a minor as a regular member of the household of the adopting parent or of a specified relative of that parent. 190 While drafters may want to include language on whether adoptions are recognized, determining beneficiary status should not depend on a genetic test. For a few children conceived coitally, and for many more children conceived through ART, there may be unwelcome surprises, with family members discovering years after the fact that one's lineage is not as expected. Courts and legislatures have long recognized the potentially disruptive effect of revealing that a man who has acted as a child's father for years or even decades is not genetically related to the child. The California statute at issue in the U.S. Supreme Court case Michael H. v. Gerald D., in which the biological father was denied the right to establish paternity of a child of a married woman, was originally enacted in 1872. 191 While the common law was primarily concerned with preventing children from being declared illegitimate, "[a] secondary policy concern was the interest in promoting the 'peace and tranquility of States and families,' . . . a goal that is obviously impaired by facilitating suits against husband and wife asserting that their children are illegitimate." 192 Even if a paternity action is allowed to be filed, some states require a finding that paternity testing be in the best interests of the child. 193 In addition, we must keep in mind that these trusts will certainly last for decades and possibly for centuries. Science continues to advance; today in Great Britain, it is legal to replace some of the mother's mitochondrial DNA so that the child has genetic material from three people, not two. 194 An earlier process involving replacement of cytoplasm resulted in babies with three genetic parents, a procedure performed in New Jersey with more than thirty women until the FDA stopped the practice in 2001. 195 As ART continues to evolve, we may have "designer babies" with no genetic parents, assembled from a menu of genes from a variety of people or even synthetically manufactured, making a genetic test even more problematic.
Thus, the key steps in drafting new trusts are to consult with the settlor on the definitions of children, grandchildren, and other class terms, and give the trustee adequate guidance is what is meant by those terms.
Solution 2: How to Interpret a Decades-Old Trust that Now Excludes ART Children?
In a decades-old trust, the presumption that adopted children are excluded would ordinarily be the starting point. Some jurisdictions may hold that trust designations to "children," "descendants," and the like are unambiguous, and so extrinsic evidence would be inadmissible to clarify the definition. Even those jurisdictions that allow reformation of an unambiguous document would not provide relief here since the predicate of proving a mistake by the testator would be missing. 196 At the same time, for the typical settlor or testator, "child," "issue," "descendants," and other similar terms probably meant a genetic parent-child relationship and therefore one would argue that ART children conceived with nondonor gametes but adopted by the genetic parents should be included. "The court's endeavor is to put itself in testator's position in so far as possible in the effort to accomplish what he would have done had he 'envisioned the present inquiry. '" 197 Courts today are more flexible in looking at the circumstances of adoption.
Society is highly aware that adoption today is not a one-size-fits-all enterprise. Some adoptions are of newborns, some are not; some are of blood relatives, some are not; and some are open, some are confidential. These situations and others have led judges and legislatures in some states to retreat from bright-line demarcations of inheritance rights beyond the child and parent in favor of a more complex, fact-sensitive determination involving actual interaction and intent. 198 Thus, the best approach may be to follow the lead of Professor Halbach, who has advocated "a special concept of loco parentis to be coupled with the constructional preference for the inclusion of adoptees. The basic rule of inclusion could thereby be limited to children who were adopted at a relatively early age and reared by the adoptive parents." 199 A California case adopted Halbach's loco parentis test with a three-step approach for adult adoptees which first presumptively excluded them from wills executed before 1951 (when California's statute was enacted), but made an exception for those raised as a minor in the adopter's home; the court then created an "exception to the exception" in cases where "the purpose of the adoption was to diminish or defeat the income and remainder interests of other beneficiaries 'for purposes of financial gain or as a spite device.'" 200 Halbach's loco parentis approach has been criticized as impractical to implement, especially for those courts reluctant to draw different lines for those adopted as adults rather than minors, and paying insufficient attention to the impediments to adopting minors such as a natural parent's objection or lack of money. 201 Still, in the case of ART children adopted by a genetic parent, a court may well be willing to include that child in the class given this test.
A loco parentis test is also preferable to a more technical decision turning on whether the ART child was adopted. In In re Doe, a trust created in 1959 for the benefit of the settlor's "issue or descendants" and their spouses stated, "adoptions shall not be recognized." 202 K. Doe, the settlor's daughter, and her husband, both New York residents, contracted with a gestational carrier in California to be implanted with donor eggs fertilized in vitro with the sperm of K. Doe's husband. 203 After the gestational carrier gave birth to twins, a California court issued a Judgment of Parental Relationship declaring K. Doe and her husband as the twins' sole legal parents. 204 Are the twins included in the trust for the settlor's issue or descendants? The twins were not genetically related to the settlor or his daughter, but the New York court held they were included because under California law they were not adopted. The court also noted that the trust provided for other nonblood beneficiaries, such as the children's spouses. Despite the fact that New York law considers surrogate parenting contracts "void and unenforceable," 205 the court found that New York allowed a judgment of parentage, and gave full faith and credit to the California proceeding. 206 Had the Does carried out their gestational agreement in another state such as Alaska or Nebraska, 207 the Does would have recognized same-sex marriage, 211 it is possible that more same-sex couples will have children. Are these ART children included when a testator or settlor provides for her "descendants" or "nieces and nephews"? The old assumptions-that children and issue are related to one by blood, and those adopted are not-need to give way to the new reality of how thousands of children are conceived today. Trusts created decades ago and still operative today force trustees and courts to struggle to carry out the intent of a settlor who never imagined that an embryo could be created in a laboratory, and need to be interpreted with today's science in mind. Those drafting new trusts must take care to update their language to include those conceived noncoitally, and perhaps even anticipate a future where one's "relatives" are not related at all. This Article has provided solutions to carry out a settlor's intent both in the case of trusts established in the 1930s or 1940s (or even earlier), and in the creation of new trusts.
